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INTERROGATION AND SILENCE: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY
CRAIG M. BRADLEY*
This article examines interrogation practices in detail in three
systems: the American, the English (and Welsh), and the Canadian
while also discussing rules from various other countries. It considers
when the Miranda-type warnings (required in all three systems) must be
given and when suspects will be deemed to have waived their rights.
This article further discusses how reliability and voluntariness of confes-
sion is assured. Finally, a particular emphasis is placed on the issue of
when a suspect's silence during interrogation may be used against him in
court. The article concludes that American courts have not done enough
to ensure reliability and voluntariness. In addition, the article further ar-
gues that the English approach whereby a suspect is warned that silence
during interrogation may be used against him in court, and then it is so
used, is fair. The article explains why this approach is not inconsistent
with Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) which bans such use based on
the current Miranda warnings. It suggests that a fifth warning as to use in
court be added to the Miranda warnings.
INTRODUCTION
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court created a sensation
with its decision in Miranda v. Arizona.1 Miranda required that the po-
lice give suspects the familiar four warnings as to the rights to silence,
counsel, etc., prior to any "custodial interrogation. 2 Initially, the politi-
cal reaction to Miranda in the United States (U.S.) was strong. At a time
of rising crime rates, many people complained that the Supreme Court
Robert A. Lucas Professor, Maurer School of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington). The au-
thor would like to thank Profs. Richard Frase, Yale Kamisar, Maximo Langer, George Thomas,
and Thomas Weigand for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 Id. at 437, 498-99.
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was "handcuffing" the police.3 In 1968, Congress passed a statute at-
tempting to overrule Miranda, an effort that the Supreme Court con-
demned as unconstitutional in 2000.'
Internationally, Miranda had a strong impact as well. A number
of countries, including most of Western Europe,5 cited Miranda and
adopted Miranda-type warnings as a requirement for their police to fol-
low. Thus, the United States was in the vanguard of international crimi-
nal procedure reform. 6  In 1972, however, Republican appointees at-
tained a majority in the United States Supreme Court,7 a majority that
they have not relinquished to this day. While the Supreme Court has
been by no means one-sided in its criminal procedure decisions, the issue
of further reform of police interrogation has been largely a dead letter.
Since 1972, the Supreme Court has never struck down a station-house
confession as being involuntary. In 1981, the Court held that if a sus-
pect asked for counsel, interrogation must cease (though not that counsel
must actually be provided). 9 Moreover, while upholding the constitutio-
For a brief discussion of the political reaction to Miranda, see CRAIG BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF
THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION 28-30 (1993). For a more in-depth discussion see,
FRED GRAHAM, THE SELF INFLICTED WOUND (1970).
4 The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 was declared unconstitutional in Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
5 France and Belgium, however, do not require a warning of the right to silence, though France
tried it for a few years. Richard S. Frase, France, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE
STUDY 201, 216 n.107 (Craig Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter WORLDWIDE STUDY]. Jan
Fermon et al., The Investigative Stage of the Criminal Process in Belgium, in SUSPECTS IN
EUROPE: PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AT THE INVESTIGATIVE STAGE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION 29, 44 (Ed Cape et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter SUSPECTS IN EUROPE].
6 Although the "Judges Rules" in England had long required warnings as to right to silence and
that anything said might be taken down and used as evidence. See also, Maximo Langer, Revo-
lution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of Legal Ideas from the Periphery, 55
AM. J. COMP. L 617 (2008) (discussing the various influences on Latin American criminal pro-
cedure reform).
7 This occurred when Republican Lewis Powell replaced Democrat Hugo Black.
8 The only confessions that have been considered involuntary by the Court involve unusual cir-
cumstances. In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), the Court struck down a confession
given in the intensive care ward after the suspect had invoked his right to counsel. In Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), the Court excluded a confession made in prison to an infor-
mant who told the suspect that he would protect him from the other inmates only if he told the
truth about the crime. However, in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985), the Court did recog-
nize that, on a petition for habeas corpus, federal courts should not be bound by a state court
finding that a confession was "voluntary." Id. at 112. Moreover, "involuntary" confessions in-
clude both those where the "police conduct was inherently coercive" and those where "the con-
fession is unlikely to have been the product of a free and rational will." Id. at 110. However, on
remand, Miller's confession was declared voluntary by the Court of Appeals. See Miller v. Fen-
ton, 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986).
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). They then undercut Edwards substantially in 1983 by
holding that a suspect's asking "what is going to going to happen to me now" was enough to
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nality of the Miranda requirement,"l the Court has weakened Miranda in
a number of ways, most notably in refusing to apply the "fruit of the poi-
sonous tree" rule to Miranda violations.1
A particularly striking feature of post-Miranda interrogation law
is that the Court has focused almost exclusively on the requirements sur-
rounding the warnings themselves. What is custody? 2 What is interro-
gation? 3 What happens if the defendant asserts his right to silence? 4 To
counsel?15
The Supreme Court has paid little attention to what happens after
the warnings are given. How long may an interrogation last? 6 Must the
suspect be given breaks for food and water? What techniques may the
police employ to obtain a confession? 7 Should interrogations be audio
or videotaped? While these issues have been the subject of extensive
academic inquiry 8 and even some state legislation, 1' the constitutional
constitute "initiation" of discussion of the crime by the suspect and to allow interrogation to
resume. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983) (plurality opinion).
10 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
11 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004). For a
strong critique of this refusal, see Yale Kamisar, Dickerson v. United States: The Case That Dis-
appointed Miranda's Critics-and Then Its Supporters, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 106 (Craig
M. Bradley, ed. 2006).
12 See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
13 See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
14 See, e.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
15 See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451, U.S. 477 (1981).
16 The Supreme Court has indirectly limited the total length of time a suspect may be held for inter-
rogation by requiring arraignment within 48 hours of arrest. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U.S. 44, 70-71 (1991). At this time, counsel must be appointed. Rothgerry v. Gillespie
County, 128 S.Ct. 2578, 2584, 2593 (2008). The Court has suggested that further interrogation
of an arraigned defendant in the absence of counsel is impermissible. Patterson v. Illinois, 487
U.S. 285, 296 n. 9 (1988).
17 Miranda itself condemned a number of interrogation techniques. 384 U.S. 436, 448-454 (1966).
These included the so-called "Mutt and Jeff' (good cop-bad cop) and "reverse lineup" tech-
niques. However, none of these methods was actually declared illegal in Miranda and they re-
main standard interrogation tactics today. See, e.g., FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 151-53, 312-13 (3d ed. 1986).
18 For example, beginning as early as 1961, many commentators have urged that police interroga-
tions be tape-recorded, and more recently, videotaped. See, e.g., Bernard Weisberg, Police In-
terrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. CRIM. L. & POLICE SCI. 21, 44-45
(1961). Compare Paul Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Assessment. 90 Nw. U. L.
REv. 387, 486 (1996), with Stephen Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits
and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 556-60 (1996). The authors disa-
greed strongly about the efficacy of Miranda, but agreed that interrogations should be video-
taped.
19 Largely as a result of well-publicized reversal of convictions due to DNA analysis, forty states
and the federal government now provide statutory access to DNA testing. The Innocent Project,
Access to DNA Testing, http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/DNA-Testing-Access.php (last vi-
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status of such questions is as unknown today as it was in 1966. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court has not established-and lower courts are di-
vided-as to what promises police may give to a suspect to induce him
to confess and courts also remain undecided as to what extent the police
may lie to a suspect.2"
The "states as laboratories" approach (i.e., the notion that the
states should be allowed to experiment with various approaches to pro-
tecting rights), often cited by conservatives as an excuse for doing noth-
ing at the federal level, is simply unsatisfactory when it comes to safe-
guarding federally guaranteed rights.21 There must be a uniform federal
standard. States most in need of federal direction will be the least likely
to develop satisfactory standards of their own.
The Supreme Court's Olympian disregard of what is happening
in the interrogation room is unjustified. False confessions continue to
plague our criminal justice system. Of over 200 convictions that have
been reversed due to DNA analysis by the Innocence Project, 25 percent
have been based, at least in part, on false confessions or admissions.22
This percentage most likely represents only a small proportion of all cas-
es based on bad confessions, as most cases are not susceptible to reversal
because of DNA analysis. 23 There is no reason to suppose that the rate of
false confessions is significantly less in cases where DNA is not availa-
sited Mar. 20, 2009). Moreover, Illinois, Maine, New Mexico, Wisconsin, and the District of
Columbia now require the recording of interrogations by statute. State Supreme Courts have
taken similar action in Alaska, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and New Jersey. Such
legislation is pending in twenty other states. The Innocence Project, False Confessions & Re-
cording of Custodial Interrogations, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/314.php (last vi-
sited Mar. 20, 2009).
20 See LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §6.2(c), at 452-59 (2d ed. 1999).
21 E.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (Opinion of Scalia, J. Concurring in the Judg-
ment).
22 The Innocence Project, False Confessions & Recording of Custodial Interrogations,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/314.php (last visited Feb. 16, 2009). See also Richard
Leo & Richard Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and
Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) (making similar findings after a study of 60 cases of false confes-
sions).
23 See Steven Drizin & Richard Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post- DNA World,
82 N.C. L. REv. 891 (2004). The authors note that the rate of false confessions found by the In-
nocence Project as of 2003, was also 25%. Id. at 905. Other studies of false confessions have
found the rate to be between 14 and 25%. Id. at 907. The authors list 125 cases of proven false
confessions between 1971 and 2003, but "proven" false confessions must represent a very small
percentage of the total.
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ble."4 Obviously, the Miranda warnings have been ineffective in pre-
venting false confessions.2 5
However, even though the United States Supreme Court may
have remained stagnant in this particular area, other countries have not
stopped developing their laws, especially in regards to the provision of
counsel upon request. Rather, in some countries, a suspect's right to pro-
tection against police overreaching has gone beyond that of the United
States. On the other hand, these same countries, particularly England,
have shown a greater willingness to allow evidence of the defendant's
silence in the face of interrogation to be used at trial than has the United
States.26 This article looks to the laws of England and Canada, countries
which have among the best developed interrogation laws, as well as the
interrogation rules of other countries, for suggestions for possible re-
forms in the United States.27
In England, counsel is provided on request of the suspect, but
with a warning that silence may be used against him/her in court. This
article concludes that the English system is a possible alternative ap-
proach to interrogation law in the U.S. This article argues that, as in
England, the taping of interrogations should be required in the U.S. Ad-
ditionally, this article concludes that Canada's, efforts toward serious in-
quiry into the voluntariness and reliability of confessions is laudable.
24 Though interrogations may be more aggressive in murder and rape cases where DNA is more
likely to be present.
25 See, e.g, William Stuntz, Miranda's Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REv. 975 (2001); Richard Leo, Ques-
tioning the Relevance of Miranda in the 2 1 st Century, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1000 (2001). George
Thomas, after studying a large number of confession cases, discussed why this was so: "As long
as suspects think they are better off trying to persuade police that they are not guilty, they will
continue to talk to police. Miranda provides knowledge that it might not be in the suspect's best
interest to talk to police. But this knowledge is meaningless as long as suspects are willing to
take the chance that it is in their best interest to talk. As that calculation is based on the suspect's
entire life telling stories, the Miranda Court was naIve if it thought the set of formal warnings
could change storytelling behavior. My study suggests that the warnings do not change suspect
behavior in any significant way." George Thomas, Stories about Miranda, 102 MICH. L.REv.
1959, 2000 (2004).
26 Compare discussion of Canada and England, infra note 27, with discussion of Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610 (1976), infra note 78.
27 See Kent Roach, Canada, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 5, at 75; David J. Feldman, Eng-
land and Wales, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 5, at 166.
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I. A COMPARATIVE LOOK: CANADA, ENGLAND, AND
WALES
A. CANADA
Canada's rules governing searches and seizures seem lax com-
pared to those in America." Yet, when it comes to interrogations, in
some ways, Canada's rules are more stringent. The 1982 Constitution's
Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 10, provides that:
Everyone has the right on arrest or detention:
(a) to be informed promptly of the reasons therefore;
(b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of
that right; and
(c) to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas
corpus and to be released if the detention is not lawful.29
Moreover, the Charter declares an exclusionary rule:
[W]here... a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a man-
ner that infringed or denied any of the rights or freedoms guaranteed
by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that,
having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the pro-
ceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 30
Anyone subject to either arrest or detention must be informed of
certain rights such as (1) the right to retain and instruct counsel without
delay, (2) the availability of legal aid for those who cannot afford a law-
yer, and (3) the right to temporary legal advice from duty counsel at the
police station, regardless of the suspect's financial status.31 Thus, unlike
in the United States, a suspect who asks for counsel in Canada actually
gets one.
The concept of detention is broad, including for example, a brief
five-minute detention in the back of a police car where the police asked
28 See Craig Bradley, The Emerging International Consensus As to Criminal Procedure Rules, 14
MICH. J. INT'L L. 171, 195-203 (1993).
29 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, § 10, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11
(U.K.).
30 Id. §24(2).
31 Kent Roach, Canada, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 5, at 57, 75-76.
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the accused questions.32 However, briefer detentions, that do not involve
"significant physical or psychological constraint," may not require warn-
ings.33
1. TuE SUSPECT'S RIGHTS
In R v. Orbanski, the Canadian Supreme Court held that "[t]he s.
10(b) right to counsel, however, is not absolute. It is subject, under s.1
of the Charter, 'to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."' 34 In Orbanski,
defendants Orbanski and Elias were stopped for suspected drunken driv-
ing. The Crown conceded that this was a "detention" for the purposes of
the Charter. This suggests that defendants should have been informed of
their right to counsel; in Orbanski's case, before being asked to perform
sobriety tests and in Elias's case, before he was asked whether he had
been drinking."
But, the Crown argued that this case created a reasonable excep-
tion to the requirement of warnings as to right to counsel "prescribed by
law" under § 1 of the Charter. The Court agreed that neither common
law nor statutory law in Manitoba compelled a driver to perform sobriety
tests or to answer police questions about sobriety.36 However, the Court
concluded that the police behavior, without warnings, was "implicit" in
the traffic laws existing at the time.37 Thus, in Canada, the seemingly
broad and explicit warning requirement upon detention is subject, not on-
ly to explicit statutory emendation, as the Charter provides, but also to a
court finding of an "implicit" legal limit. This seems to render the Cana-
dian Charter as malleable as its less explicit American cousin. Still, Or-
banski presents a rather narrow and reasonable exception to the warnings
requirement. It might have been resolved less elliptically by a simple
finding that this traffic stop did not represent "detention." This would
have been the resolution in the United States where "custody" (i.e., es-
sentially, arrest) is the prerequisite for Miranda warnings.38 Still it seems
32 Id. at 75, Id. at 75, citing R. v. Elshaw, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 24 (Can.).
33 Id. at 75, citing R. v. Mann, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, paras. 19, 22.
34 R. v. Orbanski, [2005] S.C.R. 3, 21, 2005 SCC 37 (Can.)
15 Id. at 19. They were informed of their right to counsel upon arrest and were given the opportuni-
ty to exercise their right before providing breach samples. Id.
36 Id. at 21.
37 Id. at 25.
38 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 429 (1984) (finding that a traffic stop is not "custody"
for Miranda purposes).
Vol 27, No. 2
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that, during a Terry-type stop and frisk, based on "reasonable suspicion"
of criminal activity, the warnings requirement would apply in Canada,
where it would not in the United States. 9
In Canada, after the detainee asks to speak to a lawyer, the police
must provide access to a telephone and the relevant telephone numbers.
Police "cannot elicit evidence from the detainee until he or she has had a
reasonable opportunity to contact a lawyer."4 More importantly, evi-
dence taken in violation of this requirement will generally be excluded
on the ground that it affects the fairness of the trial." There are a few
exceptions to this principle. These exceptions include: a suspect who
did not attempt to contact counsel with reasonable diligence, a suspect
who was too drunk to exercise the right, and a suspect who was "rude
and obnoxious toward the police,"42 Likewise, a lineup must be post-
poned until counsel is present.43 (Unlike the United States where only
lineups "after formal proceedings have begun" require counsel)."
In Canada once a suspect has been permitted to consult counsel,
he may be interrogated without counsel being present. This remains true
even in cases where the accused and/or counsel have indicated a desire
not to talk.45 However, "the right to counsel may be violated by pro-
longed questioning without counsel being present, police denigration of
counsel, or the offer of a plea bargain without counsel being present."46
Moreover, unlike in the United States,47 informers may only serve as "lis-
39 See KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIvMNAL PROCEDURE 607 (1 1th ed. 2005) (quoting Israel, Crim-
inal Procedure, the Burger Court and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1320,
1383-84 (1977) ("Most courts have concluded that absent special circumstances (such as arrest-
ing a suspect at gunpoint or forcibly subduing him) police questioning 'on the street' in a public
place or in a person's home or office is not 'custodial."'). See, e.g. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541
U.S. 652 (2004) (finding that a station-house interrogation of a juvenile suspect who came to the
station-house with his parents and probably did not feel free to leave was allowed without Mi-
randa warnings).
40 Kent Roach, Canada, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 5, at 57, 76.
41 id.
42 Id. This last exception tells us something about the differences between Canada and the United
States generally.
43 Id. Contrary to American procedure where only post-indictment lineups require counsel. Kirby
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
44 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690-91.
45 See, e.g., R v. Singh, [2006] 38 C.R. (6th) 217 (Can.) (refusing to recognize such a right, despite
repeated assertions of the right to silence by the suspect); See generally Benissa Yau, Making the
Right to Choose to Remain Silent a Meaningful One, CRIM. REP., Vol. 38, Sixth Series, at 226
(2006).
46 R. v. Burlingham, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206, paras. 12-16.
47 Questioning of suspects in custody is allowed by Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990).
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tening posts" for an arrested suspect, but may not actively elicit informa-
tion from an accused who has asserted his right to silence.48
In Canada, the accused may waive his right to counsel if that
waiver is "informed and voluntary."49 But, the Supreme Court of Canada
has made such a waiver difficult. For example, suspects who answered
baiting questions or participated in a lineup before being offered a rea-
sonable opportunity to consult counsel have been held not to have
waived their right to counsel.50
Unlike in the United States, in Canada an accused must also be
informed promptly of the reason for his detention or arrest, unless it is
obvious.51 For example, in Canada, in a case of attempted murder where
the victim subsequently died, the court held that the accused should have
been so informed and have had another opportunity to consult counsel. 2
There is no constitutional obligation to inform detainees of their right to
silence, but such a warning is customary to ensure voluntariness.53 In
any case, it is unnecessary because of the stringent counsel requirement
and, as noted, it does not mean that the suspect can cut off interrogation.
Once the suspect has consulted counsel and interrogation has be-
gun, often in the absence of counsel, the police may legitimately lie and
engage in deception as long as their conduct is "not so appalling as to
shock the community."54 The police can also offer inducements "so long
as the inducements do not cast doubt on the voluntariness of the ac-
cused's statement."55 The burden is on the prosecutor to establish volun-
tariness, but, curiously, the voluntariness requirement does not apply to
statements made to undercover officers or private citizens.56
48 Compare Kent Roach, Canada, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 4, at 57, 77-78 (actions of
undercover officer in jail asking accused "what happened" not violation of accused's right to si-
lence), and Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294 (1990) (Miranda warnings not required when suspect in
custody is unaware he is speaking to law enforcement officer and gives voluntary statement).
49 Kent Roach, Canada, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 5, at 77.
50 Id., at 57, 77.
51 Compare Id. at 77 (in Canada, accused must be informed promptly of reason for detention or
arrest, unless obvious), and Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1990) (suspect's awareness
of all possible subjects of questioning before interrogation not relevant to determination of vo-
luntary and knowing waiver of Fifth Amendment privilege).
52 R. v. Black, [1989] 50 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Can.).
53 id.
54 Kent Roach, Canada, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 5, at 77.
55 Id. citing R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3. (Can).
56 Id. (citing R. v. Grandinetti, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 27 (Can.)). Again, this is contrary to the holding of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). But recall, as noted
above, that undercover agents in Canada are not allowed to actively elicit incriminating informa-
Vol 27, No. 2
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2. CONFESSIONS
The Oickle case57 is particularly instructive as to the Canadian
approach to confessions. In Oickle, the accused was one of several
people who agreed to take a polygraph test after a series of fires in the
community. The testing took place at a motel. The accused was advised
of his rights to remain silent, to counsel, and to leave at any time.58 Ad-
ditionally, authorities told the accused that anything said during the test
was admissible against him. The accused signed a consent form. 9
The polygraph test lasted seven minutes and at the conclusion,
the accused was informed (apparently accurately) that he had failed the
test, but not that the test was inadmissible in court. He was questioned
for about an hour by the sergeant who administered the test, until the ser-
geant was relieved at 6:30 p.m. The accused was reminded of his right to
counsel by the detective who resumed the questioning.6 ° He confessed to
setting one of the fires thirty to forty minutes later. He was taken to the
police station. At around 8:30 and 9:15 p.m. the accused indicated to au-
thorities that he was tired and wanted to go home, but was informed each
time that he was under arrest, could call a lawyer if he wished, but could
not go home. Questioning did not stop. Finally at 11 p.m. the accused
confessed to setting the other fires.61
Canada, like the United States, has two distinct requirements as
to confessions. The first is the warnings requirement provided for by the
Charter, discussed above. The second requirement is a common-law vo-
luntariness requirement, known as the "confessions rule." The Supreme
Court of Canada is concerned with the problem of false confessions and
discussed the work of Richard Leo and Richard Ofshe, and others in con-
siderable detail in Oickle .62 The Court noted the need to be "sensitive to
the particularities of the individual suspect 63 in determining whether a
confession is likely to be false. They further noted:
[T]he danger of using non-existent evidence. Presenting a suspect
with entirely fabricated evidence has the potential either to persuade
tion from those who have asserted their right to silence. Kent Roach, Canada, in WORLDWIDE
STUDY supra note 5, at 77.
7 See Oickle, 36 C.R. (5th) 129 (Can.).
58 Id. at 130.
9 Id. at 130
60 Id.
61 Id. at 130.
62 Id. at 146-48.
63 Id. at 148.
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the susceptible suspect that he did indeed commit the crime, or at
least to convince the suspect that any protestations of innocence are
futile. 4
The Court also recognized the danger of threats and promises:
Coerced-compliant confessions are the most common type of false
confessions. These are classically the product of threats and promis-
es that convince a suspect that in spite of the long-term ramifications,
it is in his or her best interest in the short and intermediate term to
confess. 65
Finally the Court observed that:
[F]alse confessions are rarely the product of proper police tech-
niques... false confession cases almost always involve "shoddy po-
lice practice and/or police criminality ... [I]n most cases, "eliciting a
false confession takes strong incentives, intense pressure, and pro-
longed questioning... only under the rarest of circumstances do an
interrogator's ploys persuade an innocent suspect that he is in fact
guilty and has been caught.",
66
Additionally, the Court encouraged, but did not require, the recording of
interrogations, "preferably by videotape. 67
Having set forth the conditions under which false confessions
ordinarily occur, the Court then attempted to catalog those police tactics,
from earlier cases, that were and were not acceptable. For example, tell-
ing a suspect that if he confessed the charge could be reduced from mur-
der to manslaughter was improper. In Oickle, the Court said that:
Intuitively implausible as it may seem, both judicial precedent and
academic authority confirm that the pressure of intense and pro-
longed questioning may convince a suspect that no one will believe
his or her protestations of innocence, and that a conviction is inevita-
ble. In these circumstances, holding out the possibility of a reduced
charge or sentence in exchange for a confession would raise a rea-
sonable doubt as to the voluntariness of any ensuing confession. An
explicit offer by the police to procure lenient treatment in return for
confession is clearly a very strong inducement, and will warrant ex-
clusion in all but exceptional circumstances. 
68
By contrast, the Court cited two other cases where an induce-
ment offered by the police did not render the confession involuntary. In
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 149.
68 Id. at 150.
Wisconsin International Law Journal
one case, the police offered psychiatric assistance to the suspect in ex-
change for a confession. In the other case, the police urged suspect "A"
to confess, lest his friend "B" would be unjustly convicted. The Court,
on the other hand, cited the following as improper inducements: telling a
mother that her daughter would not be charged with shoplifting if the
mother confessed to a similar offense or a sergeant major keeping his
company on parade until he learned who was responsible for a stab-
bing.69
In summary, the Court concluded:
[C]ourts must remember that the police may often offer some kind of
inducement to the suspect to obtain a confession. Few suspects will
spontaneously confess to a crime. In the vast majority of cases, the
police will have to somehow convince the suspect that it is in his or
her best interests to confess. This becomes improper only when the
inducements, whether standing alone or in combination with other
factors, are strong enough to raise a reasonable doubt about whether
the will of the suspect has been overborne. 70
In Oickle, in addition to threats and promises, the Court characte-
rized "oppression" as an inducement of false confessions. For example,
the Court said that, "if the police create conditions distasteful enough, it
should be no surprise that the suspect would make a stress-compliant
confession to escape those conditions."71  Specifically, the Court in
Oickle discussed a 1999 case from the Ontario Court of Appeal. In Hoi-
lett the accused was arrested at 11:25 p.m. while under the influence of
crack cocaine and alcohol. After two hours in the cell, two officers re-
moved his clothes for forensic testing. He was left naked in a cold cell
containing only a metal bunk to sit on.72 The bunk was so cold that he
had to stand up. One and a half hours later he was provided with some
light clothes. At 3 a.m., he was awakened for interrogation, during
which he nodded off to sleep at least five times. He requested warmer
clothes and a tissue to wipe his nose, both of which were refused. His
confession was struck down as involuntary.
7 3
Against this background, in Oickle, the Court held that the ac-
cused's confession was admissible. The single dissenter argued that the
six hour length of the interrogation plus "[r]epeated threats and promis-
69 Id. at 151.
70 Id. at 153.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 154.
73 Id.
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es... against the backdrop of the polygraph procedure, they over-
whelmed the free will of the [accused].""
Because Oickle actually seems to take the voluntariness issue se-
riously and attempts to provide some guidance to police as to what they
may and may not do, it seems enlightened to American eyes, despite the
criticism offered by the dissenter and commentators.75 The interrogation
in Oickle did not violate the Miranda/Edwards requirements and it is un-
likely that the United States Supreme Court would consider the interro-
gation so lengthy as to render the confession involuntary. This is espe-
cially true given the early partial confession. The Supreme Court of
Canada's concern with reliability is admirable, so long as it is recognized
that unreliability should be a separate ground for exclusion from involun-
tariness, though the two often run together. That is, not all unreliable
confessions, such as a confession from a mentally retarded suspect, are
necessarily involuntary, and not all involuntary confessions, (i.e., confes-
sions by guilty people) are necessarily unreliable. It would behoove the
courts of both Canada and the United States to recognize this and to be
prepared to strike down confessions on either ground.
3. USE OF SUSPECT'S SILENCE
Canadian law is contradictory when considering the use of a sus-
pect's silence during interrogation. In R. v. Turcotte, the Supreme Court
of Canada summarized this contradiction.76 The Court said: "[A] person
in the power of the state in the course of the criminal process has the
right to choose whether to speak to the police or remain silent ... It
would be an illusory right if the decision not to speak to the police could
be used by the Crown as evidence of guilt."77 Thus, at first blush, the
Canadian rule is the same as the American rule on non-use of silence of
71 Id. at 133 (Arbour, J., dissenting). Accord Don Stuart, Oickle: The Supreme Court's Recipe for
Coercive Interrogation, in 36 CRIMINAL REPORTS (5th) 188, 188 (Can.) (Don Stuart et al. eds.,
2001) (arguing that Oickle was wrong for four reasons: "1. It places the focus largely on relia-
bility rather than police methods; 2. It provides the police with a manual for a wide range of ex-
cessively coercive interrogation techniques; 3. It is at odds with the Court's jurisprudence on the
right to silence and the principle against incrimination; and 4. It requires a startling level of defe-
rence by Courts of Appeal to a trial judge's determination of voluntariness.").
75 However, as Christopher Sherrin pointed out, "one may wonder how serious the Court consi-
dered the problem [of false confessions], since it did not make any material changes to the law in
response." Christopher Sherrin, False Confessions and Admissions in Canadian Law, 30
QUEEN'S L. J. 601, 608 (2005). Oickle was false. See 36 C.R. (5th) 129 (Can.).
76 R. v. Turcotte, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 519, 2005 SCC 50 (Can.).
77 Id. at 532-33.
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Doyle v. Ohio.7" Germany also adheres to a non-use approach.79 Italy,
France, and Israel by contrast, seem to allow such comment."0
However, in Canada, "[t]here are circumstances where the right
of silence must bend."81 For example, if one of the two co-defendants
had not given a prior statement, but chose to testify at trial, he may be
cross-examined as to his silence by the other co-defendant who had giv-
en a full statement to the police at the earliest opportunity. 2
Evidence of silence may also be admissible when the defense
raises an issue that renders the accused's silence relevant. Examples in-
clude circumstances where the defense seeks to emphasize the accused's
cooperation with the authorities ... where the accused testified that he
had denied the charges against him at the time he was arrested... or
where silence is relevant to the defense theory of mistaken identity and a
flawed police investigation.83
Most significant is the following exception to the non-use prin-
ciple: "cases where the accused failed to disclose his or her alibi in a
timely or adequate manner provide a well established exception to the
prohibition on using pre-trial silence against an accused... Silence
might also be admissible if it is inextricably bound up with the narrative
or other evidence and cannot easily be extricated."84
It is unclear why Canada singles out only "alibi" as an exception
to its general "non-use" position. Other defenses raised at trial, which
might naturally have been advanced by the defendant during interroga-
tion, such as self-defense or, the "I was there but I didn't shoot anybody"
claim, as well as the "frame up" claim in Doyle v. Ohio,5 would seem
equally susceptible to questioning as to why the defendant failed to tell
the police about this in the first place. It seems likely that if Canada were
7' 426 U.S. 610(1976).
79 According to noted German comparativist, Thomas Weigend: "The suspect's silence at interro-
gation cannot be used against him in any way. Rules are not very strict on what prosecutors may
say in court, but it would not be regarded as good practice for a prosecutor to argue at trial that
the defendant relied on his right to silence and therefore might have something to hide." E-mail
from Thomas Weigend to Craig Bradley, Robert A. Lucas Professor, Maurer School of Law, In-
diana University (July 6, 2007) (on file with author).
80 See CA 139/52 Attorney General v. Keynan [1953] 7 P.D. 619, 637-649 (Israel); Richard S.
Frase, France, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 5, at 201, 217-18; Rachel A. Van Cleave, Ita-
ly, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 5, at 303, 326.
81 Turcotte, 2 S.C.R. at 533 (Can.).
82 Id. at 533-34.
" Id. at 534
84 id.
85 See discussion of Doyle and TAN infra Part II.
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to confront such cases, they would extend their "alibi" exception to them
as well. However, in the United States, Doyle forbids any such question-
ing on the grounds that it is unfair to tell the defendant that he has a right
to silence and then to penalize him for using it. As will be discussed lat-
er, a solution to this problem lies between the absolutist approach of
Doyle and Canada's attempt at compromise in Turcotte. The English ap-
proach casts further light on this problem and highlights a different ap-
proach to the right to counsel during interrogation.
B. ENGLAND AND WALES
In England and Wales,86 as summarized by David Feldman:
When [police] have reasonable grounds to suspect that the intervie-
wee has committed an offence [sic], they must caution him, inform-
ing him of his right to remain silent, but also the fact that it "may
harm your defense [sic] if you do not mention when questioned
something which you later rely on in court" and, "[a]nything you do
say may be given in evidence." The caution must be repeated if the
person is arrested or charged, and the interviewee must be reminded
of it after every break in the interview. 
87
Note that the caution requirement extends to suspects prior to ar-
rest, unlike the Miranda requirements, but further that the suspect is
warned as to the (adverse) consequences of silence. However, "[p]olice
in England... get around the Miranda-type warnings by engaging in 'in-
formal chats' in suspects' homes just after arrest, during searches, in the
police car on the way to the station, or in interview rooms just before
formal interrogations are to begin."8 American police often achieve a
similar end by the simple expedient of making it clear to the suspect that
86 Scotland has a separate system. [On file with author].
87 David J. Feldman, England and Wales, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 5, at 149, 166-67.
88 Stephen C. Thaman, Miranda in Comparative Law, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 581, 601 (2001) (quot-
ing Stewart Field, et al., Prosecutors, Examining Judges, and Control of Police Interrogations,
in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE 227,232 (Phil Fennell, et al. eds., 1995)). Police in the Nether-
lands do the same. Id. Likewise, Thaman's claim that the German police have discontinued this
practice, and his citation to an earlier article of mine to support this claim is incorrect. Id. at
n.130. The ploys cited by the Field chapter are inconsistent with the rules since they generally
involve suspects as to whom police have "reasonable grounds to suspect." [On file with author.]
Feldman does not mention these ploys. [On file with author.]
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he is not in custody, 9 but the practices described by Feldman would not
be allowed in America. 90
1. THE SUSPECT'S RIGHTS
The police must further inform the suspect of his right to free le-
gal advice, though not until they get to the police station. 91
If the suspect is arrested, he must be taken to the "custody offic-
er" in every police station. This official, independent of any investiga-
tion, determines whether there is sufficient information to charge the
suspect and is responsible for maintaining an interview record, and en-
suring that the rules governing detentions are followed.92 The custody
officer must remind the suspect of his right to free legal advice and a
poster must be prominently displayed in every police station informing
suspects of this.93
Similarly to Canada, if a suspect asks for counsel, he actually
gets one. Every police station must have a "duty solicitor" either present
or on-call with whom suspects may consult.94 If the suspect does not
want a lawyer he must waive it in writing. 95 The suspect has a right to
the presence of a lawyer during interrogation. 96 But, the lawyer cannot
prevent questioning of his client. 97 Code of Practice C specifically for-
bids the police from "dissuad(ing) the suspect from obtaining legal ad-
vice."98
89 See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) (Supreme Court approving an unwamed in-
terview with a juvenile at the police station when he had been brought there by his parents and
not told he was under arrest).
90 See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (disallowing statements obtained during a post-
arrest, unwarned, "chat" but allowing a subsequent, warned, statement).
91 MICHAEL ZANDER, THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT 1984, at 106 (2d ed. 1990).
92 See generally MY, Franks, Your Rights If Arrested in England, 32 S.U. L. REV. 205 (2005) (dis-
cussing the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) and the Code of Prac-
tice C applicable to police interrogations). David J. Feldman, England and Wales, in
WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 4, at 149, 169.
9' Zander, supra note 91, at 106-07.
94 However, Feldman points out that: in practice only about one third of detainees seek to exercise
the right to legal advice... Suspects without advice face particular dangers now that courts can
draw adverse inferences from silence; proper advice about the risks and advantages of speaking
is vital, and admitting evidence of silence following a refusal to allow access to an adviser may
breach the fair trial guarantee in ECHR (check to see what this abbreviation stands for) Article 6.
David J. Feldman, England and Wales, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 4, at 168.
95 Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE), 1984, § 3.5 (Eng.).
96 Id. § 6.8.
9' Id. § 6.9.
98 Id. § 6.4.
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In England and Wales, the interview must be tape-recorded. The
suspect has a right to regular meals and at least eight hours of rest in any
twenty-four hour period of detention, as well as breaks every two hours.
After the suspect has been charged with an offense, questioning must
stop. Breach of these requirements has led to exclusion of evidence.99
Evidence has also been excluded when the suspect was bullied and hec-
tored and when officials misrepresented the available evidence or the
suspect's previous answers, leading to disorientation and a confession."'
Likewise, exclusion has also resulted when officials have threatened to
continue the interrogation until the police receive the answers that they
want and effectively brainwash the subject over thirteen hours of interro-
gation. 101
Furthermore, similarly to Canada and unlike the United States,
"evidence of conversations with undercover officers is likely to be ex-
cluded if the court concludes that the main reason for adopting the inves-
tigative technique in question was to avoid cautioning the suspect or
complying with the provisions about interview records.""0 2
2. CONFESSIONS
In terms of the admissibility requirements of confessions, Eng-
lish law requires that the prosecution prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that a confession was "not obtained by oppression or in consequence of
anything said or done which was likely to render the confession unrelia-
ble."'0 3  This replaced the old voluntariness standard. Moreover, a
tainted confession cannot generally be used to elicit a subsequent un-
tainted one.1"4 Failures to caution the suspect or to provide counsel are
serious breaches that will lead to exclusion under the "fairness" require-
ment of the code.15
" David J. Feldman, England and Wales, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 4, at 149, 169.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 168.
103 Id. at 170-71, citing PACE § 76(2).
104 Id. at 171. Susan Nash, Recent Developments in English Criminal Law and Procedure, 29 CRIM.
L.J. 228, 235-36, citing R. v. Webber, [2004] UKHL 1.
105 Id. at 171, citing PACE § 78(1). Again, this seems to reject the claim of the Field chapter, Field,
et al, supra note 78, that police use various ploys to avoid the warning requirements.
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3. USE OF SUSPECT'S SILENCE
As noted, through the practice of warning a suspect at the outset
that silence may be used against him, England has avoided the issues of
fairness that arise as a result of warning the suspect of his right to silence
and then subsequently using the assertion of that right against him.1"6
This particular provision was included in the Criminal Justice and Public
Order Act of 1994.1"7 The Act goes on to set forth the circumstances un-
der which silence may be used in court: If the suspect fails to mention a
fact that he later relies upon in his defense (e.g., self defense, alibi) the
prosecutor may comment on that silence at trial. This is true even if the
defendant does not testify, as long as counsel raises the defense at trial."'8
Moreover, if the suspect fails to account for any object in his possession
or any mark or other incriminating evidence on his person or clothing,
the prosecution may comment whether the defendant testifies or not.109
Finally, if a suspect fails to account for his presence at the time and place
of the crime, the prosecution may again comment whether the defendant
testifies or not.110
This places the duty solicitor in a very difficult position during
interrogation. Unlike an American lawyer, he cannot give his client
blanket advice to "Shut up!" The English courts, with the approval of
the European Court of Human Rights,111 have made it clear that merely
relying on counsel's advice to remain silent is not an adequate reason to
preclude adverse comment by the prosecutor at trial. Rather, "a jury
could still draw an adverse inference if it was sure that the true reason for
his silence was that he had no or no satisfactory innocent explanation to
106 David J. Feldman, England and Wales, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 5, at 149, 166-67.
107 At the time of enactment of this provision some American commentators discussed it. One,
Gregory O'Reilly was extremely negative, claiming, wrongly in my view, that this would "extin-
guish" the right to silence. George W. O'Reilly, England Limits the Right to Silence and Moves
Towards an Inquisitorial System of Justice, 85 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 402, 406 (1994). The
other, Mark Berger, was more balanced, recognizing that this did not fundamentally undercut the
right to silence, but suggesting that the English may not have thought through all of the implica-
tions of their new rule. Subsequent English law has shown this observation to have been pres-
cient. Mark Berger, Of Policy, Politics, and Parliament: The Legislative Rewriting of the British
Right to Silence, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 391, 428-29 (1995).
108 See R. v. Webber, [2004] UKHL 1, All E.R. 770 (Eng.). See also Susan Nash, Recent Develop-
ments in English Criminal Law and Procedure, 29 CRIM L.J. 228, 235 (2005).
109 See Franks, supra note 92, at 213 (summarizing the provisions of the Act).
110 See Id.
111 See Beckles v. United Kingdom [2003] 36 E.H.R.R. 13.
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give.' 12 Moreover, the "adverse comment" may not just be a prosecu-
torial argument but will likely be in the form of an instruction by the
judge to the jury to use the defendant's silence as evidence of guilt.
C. SUMMARY OF COMPARATIVE DATA
Oddly, just as American scholars are concluding that the Miran-
da warnings are inadequate to prevent or reduce false confessions, the
warnings are now widely required. More significantly, some countries
require that if the suspect asks for counsel he must actually get one,
going beyond the American practice. However, in all but England, Ita-
ly, 113 and Russia, this requirement is diluted by the fact that counsel is not
allowed to be present during interrogation. In Russia, it is weakened be-
cause counsel frequently does not do anything though present at the in-
terrogation. 1 4 In England, though counsel must be present at the interro-
gation, the counsel's role is complicated by the fact that the suspect's
silence can be used against him in court in various circumstances. Only
in the United States and Italy, and nominally in Russia, can the suspect
or his attorney cut off questioning by the assertion of the right to silence.
The United States makes up for its failure to require the appointment of
an attorney on request, by mandating that a request for counsel must
have the effect of ending the interrogation. There is, however, a question
as to the extent of police compliance with this rule.1 5 In fact, Supreme
Court decisions encourage the police to ignore the assertion of rights by
the suspect. 6
It would be easy to suggest that the United States should follow
the lead of other countries and make counsel available upon request, but
in no other country except Italy can assertion of the right to silence, upon
counsel's advice or otherwise, actually cut off questioning. Thus, pro-
viding counsel in those countries does not have the same impact that it
112 Case and Comment, R. v. Hoare and Pierce, 2005 CRIM L.R. 559, 561. [Hereinafter Case and
Comment, R. v. Hoare and Pierce]
113 Rachel A. Van Cleave, Italy, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 5, at 303, 324-27.
114 Catherine Newcombe, Russia, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 5, at 397, 433-34.
115 See Thomas, supra note 25, at 1978.
116 As I have previously discussed, "[Plolice have everything to gain and nothing to lose by ignoring
the rules. If they respect the law, they must stop questioning and get nothing." CRAIG
BRADLEY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: RECENT CASES ANALYZED 122 (2007). If they ignore the
law and continue questioning, they can't use the first confession (which they wouldn't have got-
ten anyway) but they can use the "fruits." Admissions may also be used for impeachment pur-
poses. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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would in the United States. Moreover, the provision of counsel in Eng-
land, and to a lesser extent in Canada, may actually advance the interro-
gation because of counsel's fear that his client's lack of cooperation may
be used against him at trial. On balance, then, it would appear that only
Italy can be said to be clearly more protective of a suspect's rights during
interrogation than is the United States. Moreover, it is highly unlikely
that either the Supreme Court or Congress would mandate a "duty coun-
sel" system.
There is no serious argument against video recording of interro-
gations (not just confessions). This measure would be helpful to the po-
lice in most cases in order to demonstrate that a confession was fairly ob-
tained. In addition, it would also prevent the use of confessions
browbeaten from vulnerable suspects after very lengthy interrogations,
fabricated confessions, or confessions obtained after the suspect had as-
serted his right to silence or counsel. Likewise, time limits on interroga-
tions, with required breaks, seem like obvious ways to reduce unreliable
confessions. Threats, promises, and lies present difficult problems that,
as the Oickle case suggested, must be resolved on a case-by-case basis,
but a few clues from the Supreme Court as to which police tactics are
flatly unacceptable would be useful.117
II. USE OF SUSPECT'S SILENCE
A particular focus of this article has been the question of what to
do about a suspect's silence, whether by positive assertion of his rights or
by failure to respond to police questions in the face of interrogation.
Canada insists that such silence cannot be used at trial, then concedes
that under certain circumstances, such as the assertion of an alibi, this
rule must "bend." England by contrast, warns the defendant in advance
that his silence may be used against him if it is inconsistent with the de-
fense raised at trial. Italy, Israel, and France also allow use of silence
117 Lower courts are in agreement "that there is an absolute prohibition upon any trickery which
misleads the suspect as to the existence or dimensions of any of the applicable rights or as to
whether the waiver really is a waiver of those rights." LAFAVE ET AL, supra note 19, § 6.9(c), at
589. For article devoted to this topic see Symposium, Citizen Ignorance, Police Deception, and
the Constitution, 39 TEx. TECH L. REv. 1077 (2007).
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against the defendant.1 8 Germany. 9 and the United States take the posi-
tion that such silence may never be used.'20
The source of the American prohibitory rule is the 1976 Supreme
Court case Doyle v. Ohio. 2' In Doyle, the defendants were charged with
selling marijuana to a narcotics informant At trial, the defendants
claimed that they had been framed by the informant who had brought the
marijuana to the scene (with police watching) and when the defendants
had balked at buying ten pounds, the informant had thrown $1,320 into
Doyle's car and taken back the package of marijuana (contrary to the
government's claim that Doyle had brought the marijuana and been paid
for it). The defendants were then cross-examined about their failure to
tell their story to the police at the time they were arrested.
In Doyle, the Supreme Court held that:
[S]ilence in the wake of [Miranda] warnings may be nothing more
than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda rights. Thus, every
post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State
is required to advise the person arrested... [W]hile it is true that the
Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will car-
ry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives
the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally un-
fair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's si-
lence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at
trial. 122
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by two others, argued:
[T]his is a case in which the defendants' silence at the time of their
arrest was graphically inconsistent with their trial testimony that they
were the unwitting victims of a "frame up" in which the police did
not participate. If defendants had been framed, their failure to men-
tion that fact at the time of their arrest is almost inexplicable; for that
reason, under accepted rules of evidence, their silence is tantamount
118 See Richard S. Frase, France, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 5, at 201, 217-18; Rachel A.
Van Cleave, Italy, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 5, at 303, 326.
119 E-mail from Thomas Weigand, supra note 79.
120 See also Ed Cape et al., Procedural Rights at the Investigative Stage: Towards a Real Commit-
ment to Minimum Standards, in SUSPECTS IN EUROPE, supra note 5, at 1, 22. "[J]n many juris-
dictions it is clear, in practice, that if a suspect refuses to cooperate in the investigative process
by answering questions or by providing an explanation concerning the allegation, this may well
have adverse consequences not only in respect of whether they are found guilty, but also in rela-
tion to decisions such as release pending trial." Id. Admissions may also be used for impeach-
ment purposes. Harris, 401 U.S. at 226.
121 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
122 Id. at 617-18.
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to a prior inconsistent statement and admissible for purposes of im-
peachment. 1
23
The Court's decision rested entirely on the due process rationale
and was not grounded on the Fifth Amendment right to silence. Indeed,
it does seem unfair to advise the suspect of a right to silence and then, in
effect, pull the rug out from under him at trial for using it. Justice Ste-
vens' protestation in Doyle that the defendant failed, at his trial, to ex-
plain that his silence was based on reliance on his Fifth Amendment
rights misses the point, because by then that silence has already been
brought to the jury's attention. But Justice Stevens is certainly right that,
as a matter of evidence law, the failure to mention this defense would be
tantamount to a prior inconsistent statement.
Doyle is based on the "implicit assurance" that silence will not
be used against the suspect. Nothing in Doyle, or in the due process no-
tion of fairness on which it is based, suggests that an English-type warn-
ing-that "it may harm your defense if you do not mention when ques-
tioned something which you later rely on in court"--is impermissible.
Nor does Miranda suggest that such an additional admonition would
somehow violate the Fifth Amendment.
It does seem unduly protective of Fifth Amendment rights to al-
low criminal defendants to raise claims of alibi, self-defense, or other ar-
guments that they would naturally have been expected to tell the police
but did not do so, perhaps because of the Miranda warnings, when the
warnings could be so easily modified to take this problem into account.
Suppose that A is arrested for an armed robbery which he com-
mitted. He receives his Miranda warnings and refuses to talk. He is then
released on bail. He arranges with two friends to declare that he was
with them playing cards, on the other side of town from where the rob-
bery took place, at the time in question. The defendant in these circums-
tances has a distinct, and unfair advantage if it cannot be brought out that
he failed to tell this alibi to the police, as any innocent person would.
Under current law, this failure to tell his story could not be mentioned at
trial.
It is not, in any meaningful way, compelled self-incrimination to
warn the suspect that failure to mention an alibi, for example, may be
used against him in court. Indeed, far more compulsion is present in cur-
rently allowed practices, such as falsely (or accurately) telling the sus-
pect that a co-suspect has laid all the blame on him, extended interroga-
123 Id. at 621-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tions without respite designed to break his will, and a variety of other
practices.
There may, of course, be reasons, other than guilt, as to why the
suspect chooses to remain silent rather than mention a defense to the po-
lice. For example, he may have been in a hotel room with his boss' wife
at the time of the crime and does not want to tell this to the police for ob-
vious reasons. But there will be time enough for him to explain this at
trial. There is no reason to erect an absolute bar against use of a sus-
pect's silence just because the suspect may later produce a convincing
explanation for it.
Cases subsequent to Doyle have paved the way for such an addi-
tional warning. For example, in Jenkins v. Anderson124 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that pre-arrest, and therefore pre-warning, silence could be
used against the defendant at trial: "Common law traditionally has al-
lowed witnesses to be impeached by their previous failure to state a fact
in circumstances in which that fact naturally would have been as-
serted." '25 The U.S. Supreme Court, in Fletcher v. Weir, 126 similarly held
that post-arrest silence, prior to Miranda warnings, could be used against
the accused at trial. 127 If an English warning were given, post-warning
silence in the face of questioning would be even less ambiguous than the
silences in Jenkins and Weir, which are at least as likely to be based on a
reluctance to volunteer information to the police as on any cover-up.
In South Dakota v. Neville, 128 the U.S. Supreme Court found that
the Doyle principle was not offended by use of a drunk driving suspect's
refusal to take a blood alcohol test:
[T]he officers specifically warned respondent that failure to take the
test could lead to loss of driving privileges for one year. It is true the
officers did not inform respondent that a further consequence that
124 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
125 Id. at 239 (citing 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1042, at 1056 (Chadbourn rev. 1970)); Craig
Bradley, Havens, Jenkins, and Salvucci and the Defendant's Right to Testify, 18 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 419, 434 (1981). At the time, I argued that Jenkins' silence was just as "insolubly ambi-
guous" as Doyle's: "anyone who believes that volunteering information to police is 'natural' for
a resident of Detroit's inner city has an unusually optimistic view of human nature." [On file
with author]. I further argued that, "this evidentiary ambiguity is inherent in any assertion of si-
lence by a criminal suspect." [On file with author]. But Jenkins held otherwise and silence in the
face of interrogation is much less ambiguous than a failure to volunteer information to the police
on the street. The English warning would reduce any ambiguity even further.
126 455 U.S 603 (1982).
127 See also Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408 (1980) (allowing impeachment of a defendant
by statements given to police inconsistent with his trial testimony).
128 459 U.S. 533 (1983).
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evidence of refusal could be used against him in court, but we think it
unrealistic to say that the warnings given here implicitly assure a sus-
pect that no consequences other than those mentioned will occur.
Importantly, the warning that he could lose his driver's license made
it clear that refusing the test was not a "safe harbor," free of adverse
consequences. 129
Thus, at least in this limited circumstance, the Supreme Court
has allowed police to avoid the Doyle problem by the simple expedient
of warning a suspect that non-cooperation may be used against him, even
though he was not explicitly warned that it could be used in court, as I
propose. This certainly lays the groundwork for American police to use
the English-style warning. I have little doubt that the current Supreme
Court would approve it if they did. Thus, I recommend that police de-
partments add this admonition to their Miranda warnings and that silence
in the face of interrogation could then be used to impeach the defendant
at trial if he, or his counsel in the absence of his testimony, advances a
defense inconsistent with that silence.13
0
When the suspect asserts his right to counsel, as opposed to si-
lence, however, the matter becomes more complicated. In Edwards v.
Arizona,'3 the U.S. Supreme Court distinguished between assertions of
the right to counsel and the right to silence by the suspect on the ground
that, whereas the assertion of the right to silence shows that the suspect
recognizes that he is in control of the situation, assertion of the right to
counsel is a "cry for help." 132 Such a cry is not inconsistent with later as-
sertion of a defense of alibi, self-defense, etc.
What happens after counsel arrives and consults with the client is
a difficult question that has caused much trouble in the English courts.
As noted, the European Court of Human Rights has approved of the Eng-
lish practice of police warning the defendant that his silence during inter-
rogation may be used against him and then the court instruction to the
jury that it may hold that silence against him.'3 3 However, in Beckles v.
129 Id. at 566.
130 As Justice White, who was later to author Edwards, pointed out, concurring in Mosley: "(T)he
reasons to keep the lines of communication between the authorities and the accused open when
the accused has chosen to make his own decisions are not present when he indicates instead that
he wishes legal advice... "Mosley, 423 U.S. at I10 n. 2 (opinion of White, J., concurring).
131 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
132 See Id. at 485.
133 I emphasize that I am not suggesting that a defendant's decision not to testify at trial should be
usable against him for, as I have previously argued, such a decision is also highly ambiguous,
depending on such factors as his prior record and his likely skill as a witness, and is not necessar-
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United Kingdom'34 the European Court struck down the conviction where
the defendant remained silent on counsel's advice on the ground that the
trial judge's instruction to the jury did not "allow the jury to consider ful-
ly whether the appellant's reason for his silence was a genuine one, or
whether, on the contrary, his silence was consistent only with guilt
and/or his reliance on legal advice to stay silent [was] merely a conve-
nient self-serving excuse."'35 What the difference between a "genuine"
reason for silence and a "self-serving" "reliance on counsel's advice"
might be is unexplained.
On remand, the English Court of Appeal, while allowing the ap-
peal and ordering a retrial, held that "[i]n a case where a solicitor's ad-
vice was relied upon by the appellant, the ultimate question for the
jury... remained whether the facts relied on at the trial were facts which
the appellant could reasonably have been expected to mention at inter-
view."'36 The court stressed that defendants must not be allowed to
"driv[e] a coach and horses through s.34 and by so doing defeating the
statutory objective [of allowing defendants to be impeached by silence at
interrogation]."' 37 Thus, even when counsel advises the suspect to re-
main silent, his silence may sometimes be used against him, though the
circumstances under which this may be done remain fuzzy.
In another English case, R. v. Hoare and Pierce, 138 the solicitor
advised the defendant to remain silent because it was not clear what evi-
dence the police had to suggest he had committed an offense. The judge
left it open to the jury, letting them draw any adverse inferences. The
Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that:
[E]ven where a solicitor has in good faith advised silence and a de-
fendant has genuinely relied on it in the sense that he accepted it and
believed that he was entitled to follow it, a jury could still draw an
adverse inference if it were sure that the true reason for his silence
was that he had no or no satisfactory innocence to give. 
139
Thus, it seems, even in the best case scenario for the defendant,
his silence will be brought to the jury's attention. The only issue seems
ily indicative of guilt. See generally Craig Bradley, Griffin v. California: Still Viable After All
These Years, 79 MICH. L.REV. 1290 (1981).
134 [2003] 36 E.H.R.R. 13.
135 Case and Comment, R. v. Hoare and Pierce, supra note 112, at 561.
136 Id.
137 Id.
131 [2004] EWCA (Crim) 784, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 1804 (Eng.).
131 Id. at para. 51.
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to be whether or not the jury was properly instructed to draw an adverse
inference from that silence, which they will likely do regardless of the
instruction. In 1997, one British commentator suggested that, "there is
enough in section 34... to keep the Court of Appeal in business for the
foreseeable future." 14  This has proven to be the case. The English
courts have not developed an adequate rationale for distinguishing be-
tween those cases where an adverse inference may, and where it may not,
be drawn from a defendant's reliance on counsel's advice to remain si-
lent.
Based on the English experience, I am led to the conclusion that
such silence is "insolubly ambiguous" under Doyle. Consequently, I
conclude that neither a suspect's silence based on an assertion of the
right to counsel, nor his silence after consultation with counsel, should be
admissible against him, even under the "English warning" regime that I
propose. However, a refusal to answer police questions, not based on an
expressed desire to consult counsel, may appropriately be used if the
English warning is given. While it is not entirely satisfactory to draw
such a fine distinction between the suspect's assertion of his right to si-
lence and his right to counsel, as noted, the Supreme Court has done it
before,141 and it is, I believe, consistent with the ambiguity principle that
drove Doyle.
Finally, I note that, while this proposal would produce a dramatic
change in American criminal procedure by adding a fifth "Miranda
warning" to police interrogations, it is not clear that it would have a sig-
nificant impact on the trial. Most defendants do not rely on their right to
silence during interrogation in the first place. Moreover, it seems likely
that many defendants who did rely on their right to silence would not ad-
vance an inconsistent defense at trial. Still, in those cases where the de-
fendant, through his testimony or his attorney's argument, does advance
a defense that is inconsistent with silence during interrogation, it seems
fair for the prosecution to be able to point this out.
If a videotaping requirement was imposed on interrogations, it
would not only help to determine the voluntariness of confessions, but
also help to clear up ambiguities relating to the use of the defendant's si-
140 Case and Comment, R. v. Hoare and Pierce, supra note 112, at 562 (quoting Professor Di Birch).
141 Compare Michigan v, Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (assertion right to silence allows further ques-
tioning in some circumstances), with Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (assertion of right
to counsel does not). See also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 164 (1990) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (quoting Kamisar, The Edwards and Bradshaw Cases: The Court Giveth and the Court
Taketh Away, in 5 THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 153, 157 (Choper, et al.,
eds., 1984) ("Either Mosley was wrongly decided or Edwards was.").
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lence after the "English warning." For example, suppose police report
that a defendant has said nothing after receipt of the Miranda and Eng-
lish warnings. The videotape clearly shows that the defendant was stu-
porous due to drug use and the police stopped trying to talk to him after
five minutes. This "silence" is too ambiguous to be useful for impeach-
ment. Videotaping is, of course, also extremely valuable to police to
show that a given confession was voluntary, if in fact it was. 42
CONCLUSION
Consideration of other countries' interrogation practices suggests
that they all recognize that confessions are valuable evidence and do not
want to unduly discourage police from obtaining them. Nevertheless,
some countries do more to protect against false confessions than does the
United States, most notably by enhanced requirements of audio taping or
videotaping of confessions and by the provision of counsel upon request.
However, England has countered its generous rules regarding provision
of counsel and taping by also warning suspects that failure to mention
something to the police that is later relied on at trial may be used against
him.
There is no serious argument against videotaping. The cost is
minimal and the advantages in terms of producing more reliable confes-
sions and convincing the jury that a given confession is reliable are ob-
vious to both sides. Further, the "English warning" as to the use of si-
lence is a sensible rule that would advance the search for truth. It is
unfair, as Doyle v. Ohio held, to warn a suspect unqualifiedly of his right
to silence and then use that silence against him at trial. However, it is
equally unfair to allow suspects to make up a defense, and line up wit-
nesses to support it, while prohibiting prosecutors from asking the ob-
vious question, "Why didn't you mention this defense to the police?"
The "English warning" is a solution to this conundrum and one that the
Supreme Court would likely accept.
142 See Kamisar et al., supra note 39, at 63742 for a summary of cases and articles on this subject.
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